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Who Is the Actor and Whose Goals Will Be Pursued? Rethinking Some 
Concepts of Actor Network Theory  
Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer  
Introduction 
Summarising the main ideas of actor network theory, Bruno Latour (1994; reprinted in Latour 
1999, 174–215)1 proposes four concepts to describe the role of technological artefacts in 
society: (1) interrelated programmes of action, (2) action as a property of associations of 
heterogeneous entities, (3) black boxing and (4) inscription. In his contribution “Translating 
Medical Practices” Bernhard Wieser (2006b) refers to these four concepts as a means to 
analyse prenatal testing and changes that occur in conjunction with the increased use of 
ultrasound screening and additional non-invasive examination methods. The interest he shares 
with the authors of actor network theory is to gain an understanding of the role of technology 
that is neither obscured by technological determinism nor by social determinism.  
Actor network theory—and still more Latour’s pronounced position within this strand of 
thinking—contradicts common sense views about technological artefacts. The empirical 
examples Latour provides in his texts are carefully chosen to clarify his counterintuitive point 
of view— e.g. the street bump (Latour 1992, 244) or the Berlin key (Latour 1996a, 37–51). 
Likewise, he presents thought experiments that are carefully designed to tell his story—such 
as the hypothetical reconstruction of the programmes of action and anti-programmes 
concerning the issue of leaving hotel keys at the front desk (Latour 1991) or his 
considerations concerning the combined action of the shooter and the gun (Latour 1994). In 
order to illustrate his concepts Latour applies them to a purified reality. There is nothing 
wrong with this but in empirical reality, as Michel Callon (1992, 79) states, “(i)mpurity is the 
rule”. There, the ideal typical entities and events which provide the most striking evidence for 
the theorist’s concepts are seldom to be found. However, it is with respect to understanding 
impure reality that the theoretical concepts have to prove their usefulness. In the case of 
Latourian actor network theory this means reconsidering some of its main concepts. I will do 
this by discussing Wieser’s considerations about applying actor network theory to the case of 
prenatal testing.  
Interrelated programmes of action  
“Programme of action” is a general term introduced by Latour to denote goal-directed 
behaviour of human actors as also of technological artefacts. In this terminology a certain 
human strategy of goal attainment and an algorithm determining the behaviour of a 
technological artefact are both programmes of action. The unorthodox terminology leads to an 
interesting question: Whose goals will be pursued in technically mediated human action? 
Whose goals will be pursued when the outcome of a course of events not only depends on 
human action but also on technological artefacts with their programmes of action? 
Conventional wisdom holds it to be a characteristic of well designed technology to do nothing 
else but serve its users’ goals. In Latour’s words this is the view of technological artefacts as 
“pliable and diligent slaves” (Latour 1994, 31). On the other hand, conventional wisdom 
implies the fear that this relation may turn upside down and that we may in time be 
                                                 
1  A German version of this article “Über technische Vermittlung” (cf. Latour 1998) translated by Gerald Wagner has 
been published in a book edited by Werner Rammert (cf. Rammert 1998). 
condemned to adopt the goals predetermined by the programmes of action of an omnipresent 
technological environment. Pessimists and not only those of today, believe that such a change 
is already in progress (Schelsky 1979 [1961]).  
According to Latour both views result from what he has called the “diffusion model”: a set of 
common but false beliefs to the end that society and technology are separate spheres: “Social 
determinism courageously fights against technical determinism, whereas neither exist except 
in the fanciful description proposed by the diffusion model” (Latour 1987, 141). 
Consequently, he suggests a different answer to the question of whose goals will be pursued 
and whose programmes of action will be realised. His answer is that the programmes of action 
will affect each other with the result that neither of the original goals will be realised but a 
new programme of action will emerge and a new goal to which it leads. To establish or to 
change a certain relation with an entity means to redefine—to “translate”—this entity’s 
programmes of action. In such a process the redefining entity’s programmes of action will 
change to a certain degree, too. According to actor network theory, translation—i.e. 
redefining other entities’ identities, characteristics, and programmes of action—is the 
elementary operation of network building (Callon 1991, 143). Not believing that society and 
technology are separate spheres, actor network theory holds that relations between humans, 
between technological artefacts and between humans and technology do not develop 
separately but as the co-evolving result of translation operations with humans and artefacts 
both being translators and subject to translations. Implementing and using technology within a 
certain context of human action thus implies a redefinition of the respective human 
programmes of action as well as a redefinition of the technical artefacts’ programmes of 
action and this leads to a new overall programme of action.  
As an illustration, Latour introduces the hypothetical example of the man and the gun. The 
programme of action of the man in this example is to take revenge. Obviously it makes a 
difference whether or not this man has a gun. Before the gun arrived on the scene the man 
may have intended to beat up his enemy but now it may appear to be a more satisfying 
revenge to shoot. The gun’s programme of action to speed up small pieces of metal redefines 
the man’s programme of action. With the gun in his hand, being about to take revenge means 
something different. And the man’s programme of action transforms the gun’s accelerating-
metal-pieces programme into a programme of damaging human tissue. “You are different 
with a gun in hand; the gun is different with you holding it” (Latour 1994, 33). The original 
programmes of action both are reshaped while becoming part of a new overall programme of 
action.  
Prenatal testing technologies have obviously changed the situation of pregnant women. They 
open up the new option “to tie the birth of a child to a condition” (Wieser in this volume, 
111). Since the examination methods allow Down’s syndrome to be predicted with a high 
degree of reliability or the gender of the child to be identified in advance it becomes possible 
to use prenatal diagnoses as decision criteria for or against proceeding with the pregnancy. 
Becoming pregnant becomes a necessary but non-sufficient condition of giving birth to a 
child. Barbara Katz Rothman (1986) has called this new pattern “the tentative pregnancy”.  
Applying Latour’s considerations, Wieser argues that the pregnant woman’s programme of 
action becomes translated by prenatal testing and vice versa. According to his reconstruction, 
the original goal of the pregnant woman is to give birth to a healthy child while the 
programme of action of prenatal testing is to abort foetuses with Down’s syndrome. He 
suggests conceiving the tentative pregnancy to be the new overall programme of action which 
emerges from these redefinitions (cf. in this volume, 110–111).  
If we start with the assumption that to give birth to a healthy child was the original goal of the 
typical pregnant woman we will, however, end up with a different story than Latour. In this 
story the programme of action is redefined but the goal remains the same. In earlier days what 
a woman could do to pursue the goal of giving birth to a healthy child was to take care of her 
own health, to avoid overexertion, possibly to keep a special diet, and so on. With the 
possibility of gaining knowledge about genetic defects of the unborn child, pursuing this goal 
now includes the option to abort a foetus with Down’s syndrome. Thus, with prenatal testing 
pursuing the goal to give birth to a healthy child does mean something different. It is a 
different programme of action. Nevertheless, the goal itself does not change. The story we 
end up with is the old-fashioned story of technology as a means to human ends, a story 
strengthening the position of social determinism Latour wants to avoid.  
Why is prenatal testing such a powerless actant within this story? The answer is that there is 
no conflict or contradiction between what Wieser imputes to be the programme of action of 
prenatal testing (abortion of foetuses with serious genetic defects) and the goal of the pregnant 
woman to have a healthy baby. Within the frame of reference of this story the pregnant 
woman easily integrates prenatal testing as an additional means of realising her goal. 
Moreover, within this story it makes more sense to say that aborting foetuses with Down’s 
syndrome is part of the programme of action of the pregnant woman than to attribute it to 
prenatal testing. What amniocentesis or ultrasound screening devices as actants really do is 
only to generate the data for prenatal diagnoses. Within this story their programme of action is 
nothing more than to provide means for the realisation of human goals.  
This is not the only possible reconstruction. A very different story unfolds if one takes the 
opposite to the tentative pregnancy as point of departure. Wieser describes the tentative 
pregnancy by the characteristic that it “changes (…) the relationship between the pregnant 
woman and the child in her body (…) It is not an unconditional love for the child, yet. It is a 
love that makes a stipulation or that develops only under certain circumstances” (ibid., 111). 
This characterisation implies a description of what the opposite to the tentative pregnancy 
would be: a pregnancy characterised by a woman who accepts her unborn child without 
reservation, who develops an unquestioning love for this new being, and who is ready to care 
for it whatever the circumstances will be. Admittedly, it is overly idealistic to believe that this 
“unconditional pregnancy” was the pregnant women’s programme of action until prenatal 
testing technologies came into existence. We know only too well that it is not a new 
behavioural pattern for parents to make desired attributes—e.g. concerning the baby’s 
gender—a precondition of winning their (the parents’) love. In one crucial respect, however, 
the prior situation of not having prenatal testing devices and techniques at one’s disposal was 
different: if the pregnant woman was to develop a loving relationship with her unborn child it 
was necessarily to a certain degree a relationship of unconditional love. This is not to say that 
pregnant women necessarily did develop such a relationship. There are and have been many 
other ways to interpret a pregnancy, e.g. as a misfortune that should be unmade or as a 
provision for old age. Nevertheless, if an emotional relationship was to emerge this was a 
process which could not be attached to certain conditions of the unborn child since these were 
unknown. Thus, to the degree that the mothers-to-be entered into emotional relationships with 
their unborn children, it is safe to say that the underlying programme of action was that of the 
unconditional pregnancy.  
With the unconditional pregnancy as the point of departure the new option of determining 
health conditions or the gender of the unborn child in advance has the potential not only to 
add a new means to an already existing goal but to affect the pregnant woman’s programme 
of action as a whole. The preceding state of not being able to acquire this knowledge, as it 
were, hustles the pregnant woman into a relationship of unconditional love if she develops 
positive feelings at all. Thus, when she eventually learns that the child is not of the desired 
gender or finds out about a disability, she will already have taken the baby into her heart. 
Consequently, there is a good chance that her love and acceptance will continue. Prenatal 
testing destroys this blissful ignorance. Knowing ahead about her unborn child’s disability it 
will perhaps become much more difficult for the pregnant woman to accept it without 
reservation. Where unconditional love is to some extent a by-product of the blissful ignorance 
of pre-prenatal testing days it is something that parents who learn in advance about the 
disability of their baby may find impossible to develop. Telling the story this way prenatal 
testing embodies an antiprogramme to the pregnant woman’s programme of action. Now 
ultrasound screening or amniocentesis do much more than only generate the data for prenatal 
diagnosis. They participate in providing a knowledge which may greatly affect the pregnant 
woman’s orientations and actions. Exposed to this anti-programme, the unconditional 
pregnancy becomes transformed into the tentative pregnancy as the new overall programme 
of action.  
Both stories certainly reflect some truth. Women in different circumstances and situations 
may pursue different goals and employ different programmes of action. Additionally, it 
should be taken into account that both stories represent only a partial view of a larger picture 
and perhaps of the same picture. The differences between the two reconstructions, however, 
show that empirical reality is less elegant than actor network theory. The view advocated by 
Latour that from the interrelation of human and technical programmes of action something 
new results, “the creation of a new goal that corresponds to neither agent’s program of action” 
(Latour 1994, 32), is a constricted view. Wishing to avoid social determinism and technical 
determinism as well, he conceals that the power to push through one’s own goals can be 
distributed very unevenly between the parties involved. It is true that there are pregnant 
women who successfully resist changing their programmes of action—for example by not 
allowing the physician to tell them the child’s gender in advance. On the other hand a few 
everyday experiences with ticket machines should be enough to prove that the same holds for 
technological artefacts. Thus, what results from the interrelation of human actors and 
technological artefacts can be described more comprehensively as a continuum with the social 
deterministic outcomes and technical deterministic outcomes being its poles.  
Additionally, it should be noted that the resulting programme of action does not merely 
depend on the particular human actor or the particular technical device. Rather, it depends to a 
large degree on the allies which can be mobilised to support one or another programme of 
action. Analysing the establishment and changes of programmes of action as processes of 
mobilising allies lies at the core of actor network theory. Latour’s paradigmatic example is the 
hotel manager and his goal to cause the guests to leave their room keys at the front desk 
(Latour 1991, 104–110).  
The relevance of this concept to the subject of prenatal testing is easy to show. For example, it 
could be asked why, in contrast to the situation in India or China, the possibility to determine 
the unborn child’s gender has not led to increasing abortion rates of female foetuses in 
western countries. The answer is obvious: aborting foetuses because of their gender is against 
the law and the legal authorities are willing and able to enforce this law effectively. 
Additionally, to give birth to a girl is neither an economic disaster nor a cultural stigma. The 
incentives to run the risk of violating the law, therefore, are limited. Consequently, there are 
at least three powerful allies supporting the anti-programme to the programme of using 
prenatal testing as a means of this kind of selection, allies which may prove to be less 
powerful or absent in Hindu India or in rural China: a culture which does not stigmatise the 
female gender, a social environment that does not make male children a question of survival 
and a legal system capable of enforcing the anti-programme.  
To arrive at a comprehensive picture of how prenatal testing changes the concept of 
pregnancy it would be necessary to take all these allies into account. There is, for instance, the 
tradition of European humanism which may turn out to be a strong ally to the unconditional 
pregnancy even in the age of prenatal testing. On the other hand, Wieser (in this volume, 120 
f.) mentions the neo-liberal policy of reducing society’s responsibility for the individual, 
which may put pressure on a woman who is pregnant with a disabled child. Another ally to 
the tentative pregnancy is a legal system which does not outlaw the terminating of pregnancy 
in the case of disabilities of the foetus. From this extended point of view the new 
programme(s) of action which emerge in relation to prenatal testing do not only result from 
the interrelation between a certain kind of human actors (pregnant women) and a certain kind 
of technology (prenatal testing devices and techniques) but are the result of a much more 
extensive association of heterogeneous entities. Moreover, the same applies to the already 
existing programmes of action from which this development departs. In all instances action is 
“a property (…) of an association of actants” (Latour 1994, 35).  
Who is the actor?  
In Latour’s example of the man and the gun, a new overall programme of action and a new 
goal emerge out of the mutual translations between the man and the gun. Inevitably, this leads 
to the question: “Who, then, is the actor …?” (ibid., 32). Latour’s answer is that together with 
the new programme of action a “new composite agent” (ibid.) comes into existence who is the 
actor, a “hybrid actor composed (…) of gun and gunman” (ibid., 33). Wieser adopts this view 
by arguing that in his empirical case the “association of a pregnant woman and prenatal 
testing becomes a new actor” (in this volume, 112). Against the background outlined in the 
preceding paragraph, however, it should be clear that many more actants participate in 
bringing about a certain programme of action. So for what reason does Latour privilege those 
two actants? And does it make sense to single out the pregnant woman and “the” prenatal 
testing in the same way?  
It is my impression that Latour takes only the two actants into account for the sake of the 
example’s simplicity. He wanted to demonstrate what results from combining human and 
technical programmes of action and has chosen the simplest possible scenario: a two-actant 
scenario, one actant being a human the other being a technological artefact. Thus, the example 
is not intended to be empirically exhaustive but to be concise. Its message, thus, is not that a 
certain subset of the actants involved makes up the new actor. Rather, Latour’s point of view 
is that all actants participating in bringing about a certain action together constitute the actor 
of this action. This becomes clear when Latour moves to examples which are empirically 
more substantial. He describes, for instance, the hybrid actor of the action “flying” in such a 
way: “It is by mistake, or unfairness, that our headlines read, ‘Man flies,’ ‘Woman goes into 
space’. Flying is a property of the whole association of entities that include airports and 
planes, launch pads and ticket counters. B-52s do not fly, the U.S. Air Force flies” (Latour 
1994, 35).  
However, this view of the hybrid actor raises a difficulty: the more comprehensive the list of 
actants becomes which contribute in one way or another to the action in question the more 
difficult it is to conceive the association of all these as one actor, i.e. as one entity to which 
one overall action can be addressed. The man with the gun is a persuasive example of a 
hybrid actor because this combination evokes the picture of a cyborg and because the 
language provides distinct terms for this combination of actants: shooter or gunman. But if 
one adds, for instance, the influence of the National Rifle Association on the accessibility of 
the gun and the influence of the man’s tough neighbourhood on his willingness to use force it 
would not be this easy to imagine the unified hybrid actor to which the resulting action is to 
be attributed. Latour seems to avoid this problem with the aviation example. Nevertheless, it 
remains unsolved. The reason why the much more comprehensive list of actants in this 
example can be easily subsumed under one hybrid actor is that this hybrid entity—the U.S. 
Air Force—is a corporate actor. And corporate actors are a kind of hybrid entity which we are 
already used to seeing as actors—without having to refer to actor network theory. It is 
certainly not this corporate actor alone, however, that makes the B-52 fly. Without the 
government funding the Air Force and without the oil industry providing kerosene the B-52 
would certainly not fly. So, one again runs into the problem of identifying the hybrid actor. 
These considerations do not speak against analysing actions as properties of associations of 
heterogeneous entities. But they show that it is impossible to conceptualise such an 
association as a whole to be a hybrid actor. Identifiable hybrid actors always include only a 
subset of the whole array of entities contributing to the action in question. Thus, the question 
remains open why one should privilege such a subset by calling it the hybrid actor of this 
action. I will come back to this point later.  
There is a second problem with the concept of the hybrid actor. It is related to the already 
mentioned fact that the interrelated actants’ power to redefine each other may be distributed 
unevenly. The existence of prenatal testing devices and methods, for example, may have an 
influence on how pregnant women define their pregnancy. In Latour’s terminology one might 
say that prenatal testing translates her into being tentatively pregnant (if we leave aside all the 
other actants’ contributions to this translation). Only a small part of her programmes of action, 
however, is subject to this redefinition. Most of the pregnant women’s activities take place in 
spheres of action in which prenatal testing devices certainly do not play a part: at work, with 
her family at home, in the supermarket, and so on. In contrast, the physician’s examination 
room is the only sphere of action of amniocentesis or ultrasound screening. Thus, the 
programmes of action of these devices and methods develop completely under the influence 
of this single context (or more generally: under the influence of the devices’ domains of 
application). The asymmetry between the pregnant woman and the prenatal testing devices is 
obvious: these devices’ identity is largely defined by actants within the context of medical 
examination whereas the pregnant woman lives a life outside of the examination room where 
she is out of these actants’ reach. Within an association of heterogeneous entities different 
actants will usually have different degrees of freedom to join and to leave, to accept and to 
reject attempts to redefine them. If one takes this into account, the observation that a certain 
action is a property of such an association of heterogeneous actants is not a sufficient reason 
to view it as a hybrid actor.  
Finally, a third difficulty of the concept of the hybrid actor shall be mentioned. The actors of 
the pre-Latourian age, that is to say, the human individuals and the corporate actors, have the 
irritating habit of accepting only their own kind as actors—at least in important matters. For 
example, in the case of an incident they take pains to find out if this event is caused by human 
individuals or corporate actors or if it results from technical failure, from fateful coincidence 
or whatever. And they react very differently to such an event depending on whether they 
believe the former or the latter to be true. Using the conceptual tools of actor network theory, 
it is easy to identify this behaviour as translation operation: by reserving actorhood to 
themselves, humans (and corporate actors) constantly define their relation to each other and to 
the non-human world. If, according to actor network theory, translation is the operation from 
which the interrelated programmes of action emerge, we cannot ignore this kind of 
translation. In this sense actor network theory itself does not allow associations of 
heterogeneous actants to be treated indiscriminately as hybrid actors.  
Michel Callon, the second founding father of actor network theory, has suggested 
distinguishing between actors and intermediaries. This suggestion can help to deal with the 
three difficulties of the concept of the hybrid actor I have highlighted here. According to 
Callon, “(a)n intermediary is anything which passes from one actor to another, and which 
constitutes the form and substance of the relation set up between them” (Callon 1992, 74; cf. 
Callon 1991, 134). Intermediaries, thus, are the “translation operators”. In actor network 
theory actors are defined by the capability to translate other entities. “By ‘actor’ we mean any 
entity (…) which defines and constructs (more or less successfully) a world peopled with 
other entities, gives them a history and identity, and qualifies the relationships between them” 
(Callon 1992, 79). This definition of Callon’s is in line with Latour’s view of actors (or 
actants) as “entities that do things” (Latour 1988a, 303; cf. Latour 1991, 121). However, since 
intermediaries are also defined as entities which translate other entities this definition alone 
does not allow a distinction to be made between actors and intermediaries. “If we held to this 
definition alone, it would not be wrong to say that an intermediary can be an actor” (Callon 
1992, 79–80). According to Callon the translation operation has a further characteristic: the 
need to attribute authorship (Callon 1991, 140–141). It is this characteristic from which the 
difference between actors and intermediaries stems. Among all the entities which translate 
each other, actors are those to whom authorship of translations is attributed. “Any translation 
operation is accompanied by an attribution process, as a result of which the intermediaries in 
circulation are imputed to groups, who are thus transformed into actors” (Callon 1992, 85). Or 
to put it another way: “an actor is an intermediary attributed with putting other intermediaries 
into circulation” (ibid., 80).  
Latour’s question “Who is the actor?” now splits into two different questions: Who are the 
entities which—by translating each other— together build up and realise a certain overall 
programme of action? And who are the entities to whom the resulting action is attributed? 
The answer to the first question lists all the intermediaries or actants (in Latour’s terminology) 
which contribute in one way or another to a certain action. The answer to the second question 
reduces this list to the actant(s) or group(s) of actants which is (are) viewed to be this action’s 
author(s). Latour’s concept of the actant presupposes the difference expressed by these two 
questions, too. An “actant” is “any entity that acts in a plot until the attribution of a figurative 
or nonfigurative role” (Latour 1994, 33). In other words: the entities are actants until the 
authorship of the action in question is attributed. Afterwards they are actors or objects. Thus, 
we have to deal with two different questions: the question of agency (who are the actants or 
agents2 of an action?) and the question of actorhood (who is imputed to be the author?).  
It is the methodology of actor network theory to treat all entities observed counterfactually as 
if the attribution of authorship had not yet happened and as if all these entities, thus, still were 
actants. Without doubt this approach has proved to be very fruitful in reconstructing the 
respective contributions of the heterogeneous entities to the observed overall programmes of 
action. However, this analytical perspective addresses only the first question, the question of 
                                                 
2  Latour uses “agent” and “actant” as synonyms but prefers the latter for reasons of terminological neutrality (cf. 
Latour 1994, 33). 
agency. Consequently, it is misleading to conclude that the association of actants identified in 
this way is the hybrid actor of the action resulting from these actants’ interrelated programmes 
of action—at least if one is in search of an answer to the second question, the question of 
actorhood.  
Against the background of these considerations I shall now come back to the concept of the 
hybrid actor. There is a simple answer to the first problem mentioned above, i.e. to the 
problem of privileging a certain subset of all actants which co-produce a certain outcome by 
calling only this subset the hybrid actor of the outcome: actorhood is a result of attribution 
and attribution means selecting between actants and, consequently, privileging some of them. 
But why do we select this and not that subset of actants? Why do we possess terms to address 
certain associations of heterogeneous entities as actors (e.g. the U.S. Air Force or the 
Lufthansa as the actor of “flying”) and why do we use certain terms elliptically to denote 
certain subsets of actants (such as in “a car drives by” where the term “car” means the hybrid 
of car driver and car) while other actants and subsets of actants are left aside?  
One part of the answer lies in what Callon calls the convergence and irreversibility of an actor 
network. The degree of convergence of an actor network is the extent to which “any one 
actor’s3 activities fit in easily with those of the other actors, despite their heterogeneity” 
(Callon 1992, 87). The degree of irreversibility is the extent to which each actant in an 
association of entities “is inscribed in a bundle of interrelationships” (Callon 1991, 150). To 
the extent that this is the case, “any attempt to modify one element by redefining it leads to a 
general process of retranslation” (ibid.). The interrelatedness of translations creates 
irreversibility because it is usually more difficult to redefine a whole array of actants than 
only a single one.  
There are different ways leading to the effect that a set of actants’ activities fit together. 
Callon treats convergence mainly as a result of alignment, meaning that in the process of 
“interdefinition” (ibid., 82) the actants develop congruent definitions: “When the translation is 
‘perfect’, what A says about A, I and B is the same as what B says about A, I and B or what I 
says about A, I and B” (ibid., 84).4 It follows, then, that an association of entities which is 
strongly convergent in this sense at the same time is a strongly irreversible network. Because 
of its irreversibility and because every element defines itself as parts of the same whole, such 
a network becomes an unified entity, that is to say, an entity whose elements “act as one” 
(Latour 1987, 131).  
Contributing to a certain outcome does not presuppose a sharing of other actants’ definitions. 
For this reason, to act as one is always a property of subsets and not a property of the entire 
association of heterogeneous entities who contribute to an overall programme of action. The 
most prominent of these subsets are the corporate actor and the cyborg. The corporate actor’s 
“structure of positions (…) that exists independently of the occupants of those positions” 
(Coleman 1990, 427) certainly is the most explicit way to make actants act as one. In social 
sciences, corporate actors are usually conceived as composed only of human individuals. 
Raymund Werle (2002, 126), however, has suggested a more comprehensive view of 
                                                 
3  To avoid confusion, the term “actor” in this quotation should be replaced by “actant” or “agent”. Convergence 
addresses the matching of all entities’ activities and not only of those to which actorhood is attributed. 
4  This understanding of convergence leaves aside that convergent actions as well may result from highly disparate 
definitions of the situation as John Law and Callon’s case study of the development of the British TSR.2 fighter 
shows (cf. Law & Callon 1992). 
corporate actors which includes the activities of technological artefacts. Empirically it is 
evident that artefacts as well as human individuals may act as occupants of positions. 
Obviously, my interaction with the bank as corporate actor is more or less the same whether I 
withdraw money at the counter or use the automated teller machine. Moreover, the concept of 
the corporate actor provides a useful model to analyse the combined action of users and 
technological artefacts as I have argued elsewhere (cf. Schulz-Schaeffer 2005). The term 
“cyborg”, as I use it, refers to the single human individual which, in combination with one or 
more artefact(s), constitutes (or is perceived as) a hybrid entity. To act as  This is one of the core 
notions of concepts of heterogeneous cooperation (Strübing et al. 2004). one in this case refers to the 
phenomenon that it is impossible to describe the combined action without having the human 
activities and the artefact’s activities in mind. This is obviously true with respect to the action 
“to shoot someone down” or the action “to drive by”.  
The perception of a certain subset of actants to act as one seems to be a necessary condition 
for attributing actorhood to hybrid entities. It is not, however, a sufficient condition. The fact 
that without this or that tool or machine a certain action would be impossible does not prevent 
us from attributing combined activities of this kind to humans alone. Here, the second and 
third difficulties with the concept of hybrid actors come into play. In the face of observed 
differences in the actants’ power to define other actants’ programmes of action it is not 
unusual to attribute the action’s authorship only to the actant(s) perceived as most powerful in 
this respect—even when it is seen that the action in question would not occur without the 
other actants’ contributions. This may lead to an attribution of actorhood to technical as well 
as to human actants, but more often than not actorhood is attributed to humans.  
This is not especially surprising since humans have brought numerous intermediaries into 
circulation through the ages in order to ensure their actorial primacy over the non-human 
world. According to Callon (1992, 80), authorship “is often inscribed in the intermediaries 
themselves. The scientific article, for instance, is signed, and the technical object is 
trademarked. Incorporated skill is attributed, under our law at least, to the body itself and to 
the subject who is said to ‘animate’ it. One of the essential elements of the description 
contained in an intermediary is the identification of the actor who claims attribution of the 
author’s rights”. Inscriptions of this kind are powerful means of attributing authorship. As 
Callon’s examples indicate, their power depends on the degree to which they are backed by 
legal norms, by social conventions or by the beliefs of everyday knowledge. Many of these 
norms, conventions and beliefs confine actorhood to human individuals, thus being 
themselves powerful intermediaries for ensuring human actorial primacy.  
“Distinguishing between actors and intermediaries”, Callon (1992, 80) says, “has nothing to 
do with metaphysics, ontology, or the philosophy of the rights of man. It is above all an 
empirical problem whose solution is to be found in observation”. The preceding 
considerations indicate that the space for attributing actorhood to hybrid associations of 
actants is limited. At least this is true if one follows Callon and treats actorhood to be the 
result of empirically observable attribution of authorship. An alternative would be not to 
observe how actorhood is attributed empirically but to claim that actorhood should be 
attributed in a certain way. This is what Latour does when he denounces the attribution of 
flying to the human pilot alone as a mistake or unfairness. To argue this way means to bring a 
normative aspect of the attribution of actorhood into play: for good or for bad, the action’s 
actants should all be held responsible for the outcome. Or as Latour says: “Responsibility for 
action must be shared among the various actants” (Latour 1994, 34). This is also the rationale 
behind Bernhard Wieser’s claim to view the association of the pregnant woman and prenatal 
testing as a hybrid actor. He claims: “Obviously it is not possible to presuppose an exclusive 
responsibility of a single actor, e.g. of a pregnant woman, who takes an ‘autonomous’ 
decision (or that technology is to blame for everything). If action is distributed this can only 
mean that responsibility is also distributed” (in this volume, 125). Empirically, the opposite is 
true: this is not only possible but the usual form of attributing actorhood. Thus, the 
background of normative claims of this kind is that there is a difference between the list of 
actants contributing to the emergence of a certain programme of action and the one or more 
actant(s) to which authorship and responsibility are actually attributed. To grasp this 
difference we are in need of concepts for distinguishing between agency and actorhood. The 
topics of black boxing and inscription which are the subject of the following sections will 
show this more clearly.  
Black boxing  
Convergence and irreversibility are the two features by which the interrelated activities of 
humans and non-humans become black boxes. Convergence and irreversibility rely on 
successful processes of enrolment and alignment, i.e. on the degree that the actants have 
matching expectations5 of their respective activities and show the expected behaviour. As 
pointed out above, convergence and irreversibility describe an association of heterogeneous 
actants’ property to act as one. To act as one is Latour’s criterion to call such an association a 
black box (cf. Latour 1987, 131). Black boxing means that the complex interrelatedness of the 
many actants contributing to the overall programme of action becomes invisible. Black 
boxing is an implication of the network’s property to act as one. From the preceding section it 
is clear that “becoming invisible” has two different meanings depending on how actorhood is 
attributed. In the case of attributing actorhood to a hybrid entity black boxing is part of 
creating this entity. The other actors orient their actions to the association as a whole—
because they are used to doing so for practical reasons or convenience, because it is legally 
required, or for several other reasons— whereby the association becomes the unified actor as 
which it is treated, and whereby the association’s actants and their activities become more or 
less invisible. For example, knowing how the preparation of a bank statement is distributed 
between the bank clerks’ and the bank computers’ activities is completely irrelevant for all 
practical purposes. The regular customer has virtually no idea of what happens inside the 
bank, nor is this knowledge necessary, since the customer interacts with “the bank”, i.e. with 
the hybrid corporate actor (cyber criminals, on the other hand, will be interested in 
deconstructing this actor and dealing only with one bank computer or another).  
An association of heterogeneous actants’ property to act as one, however, as we have seen, 
may as well go along with the attribution of the resulting action’s authorship to only one (and 
often to a human) actant from this association. For example we will usually view a medical 
examination as the physician’s action rather than as a hybrid actor’s action. In these cases, a 
different form of invisibilisation occurs. The other actants’ contributions do not become 
invisible in the way the components of a technical device are enclosed in its casing. The 
picture for describing this form of invisibilisation is rather the sun outshining the stars. This is 
                                                 
5  “(W)hatever term is used for humans, we will use for nonhumans as well” (Callon & Latour 1992, 353). This is 
one of actor network theory’s terminological strategies to develop an unbiased vocabulary, but in my opinion not 
the best way since it provokes misunderstandings. However, it makes sense to use the term “expectation” in this 
way symmetrically because the shape of technological artefacts and their algorithms literally embody certain 
expectations—such as the expectation that human users are of a certain height in the case of the usual door knob. 
to say that their contributions to the overall programme of action become invisible because 
the actant to which actorhood is attributed diverts attention away from them.  
For analysing the case of prenatal testing this second form of invisibilisation may prove to be 
more important than the first. In the part of his contribution where Wieser examines the black 
box qualities of ultrasound screening he distinguishes between two kinds of situations. In the 
first case no abnormality of the foetus is detected. He describes this as a situation where 
ultrasound examination acts as a black box. Since everything is fine there is little reason to 
ask who has produced this result and how (cf. in this volume, 116–117). Perhaps not even the 
question of the result’s authorship occurs so that we do not have to decide whether we should 
interpret the contributing actants’ invisibilisation according to the encasing model or 
according to the outshining model.  
A different situation occurs when the examination shows abnormal features of the foetus. In 
this case, Wieser argues, “(t)he black box falls apart” (ibid.). He compares the situation to 
Latour’s (1994, 36) example of the malfunctioning overhead projector. The malfunction, in 
Latour’s example, leads to opening the black box whereby the overhead projector’s true 
nature as an association of heterogeneous entities is revealed (until it is repaired and becomes 
a black box again). Wieser’s main reason for drawing this analogy is that it is only in the case 
of a positive result that the pregnant woman finds out what is implicit in every ultrasound 
examination but remains (more or less) invisible (to the pregnant woman) unless this 
examination indicates an abnormality: “that ultrasound is an element in an action sequence” 
(in this volume, 117) with the much more risky amniocentesis as the next step in the case of a 
positive finding and the decision about having or aborting a disabled child as the then 
following step if this examination confirms the finding indicated by ultrasound screening.  
A positive finding of an ultrasound examination is something pregnant women usually do not 
expect and the consequences of which are unforeseen and invisible to many of them in 
advance. However, this is not true for most of the other actants contributing to prenatal testing 
as the overall programme of action: in the case of positive findings skilled physicians stand by 
to perform amniocenteses, laboratories stand by to analyse the samples. And in the case that 
these examinations confirm the findings, legal norms stand by to regulate the conditions of a 
legal abortion and so on. The situation of a positive finding, thus, seems not to be comparable 
to the malfunctioning overhead projector. The roles and respective expectations of the actants 
and their interrelated activities seem to fit in very well both in the case of a positive finding 
and in the case of a negative finding. What is certainly a crisis for the pregnant woman is not 
a crisis for prenatal testing or prenatal medical care because these are contexts which exist for 
dealing exactly with events of this kind.  
What remains invisible in the case of a negative result of ultrasound screening but becomes 
visible in the case of a positive finding is the status of the pregnant woman as an actor. In the 
case of a negative result ultrasound screening remains a part of the normal routine of prenatal 
care— not a medical treatment that is felt to need much deliberation on whether or not to go 
through with it. Many parents-to-be see it more as a family event than a medical examination: 
they meet their physician for watching “baby TV” as ultrasound screening is nicknamed. In 
the case of a positive finding, however, it becomes clear that to undergo the treatment is a 
decision that may have far reaching consequences. It is a decision to search for a possible 
disability of the foetus. And in the case of a positive finding this decision inevitably imposes 
on the pregnant woman (or the couple) a subsequent decision: knowingly, then, she has (they 
have) to decide whether or not to have and to raise a disabled child. “Non-invasive screening 
tests”, thus, “lead to ‘inescapable decisions’” (Wieser 2006a, 50). To undergo these tests is a 
decision which in the case of a positive finding creates a path of subsequent decision making 
and actions. This is exactly what, according to Bernhard Wieser, is invisible and blackboxed 
as long as ultrasound examinations are part of the routine of normal prenatal care. 
Invisibilisation here means that the pregnant women and their partners do not realise that to 
undergo ultrasound screening is a decision by which subsequent decisions are “pre-informed” 
(ibid., 53), which ultimately may lead to the decision alternative between aborting and raising 
a disabled child.  
This invisibilisation obviously does not follow the pattern of the encasing model. The reason 
for the pregnant woman’s decision to become invisible is not that there is a hybrid actor to 
which the overall action is attributed and under which her activities are subsumed and thus 
invisibilised. Rather, the invisibilisation under discussion here shows the pattern of the 
outshining model: the setting of ultrasound examination—being perceived as normal routine, 
as harmless and without risk for mother and child, as an event rather than as a medical 
examination—draws the attention away from the fact that undergoing this test is a decision 
that may bring the parents into a situation where they cannot avoid making a life or death 
decision about their probably disabled child.6 Either the examination as an action is 
unproblematically attributed to a single physician or to a medical unit. Then, the 
invisibilisation can easily be understood to show the pattern of the outshining model. Or it is 
simply seen to be part of the normal practice of prenatal care—rendering unnecessary explicit 
attribution of actorhood (as it is often the case in routinised, habitualised or taken-for-granted 
practices). In this case the invisibilisation can be interpreted by a variant of the outshining 
model. Metaphorically speaking, the normal and unproblematic practice of conduct makes the 
active contribution of the pregnant woman invisible in the way the daylight diffused by the 
atmosphere outshines the stars.  
To sum up: the positive finding brings to light the character of ultrasound examination as a 
tool to detect possible disabilities whereas in the case of a negative result this remains more or 
less invisible. For the pregnant woman (or the couple) to learn in retrospect to have 
contributed to an action in gathering this information may or may not turn out to be part of the 
crisis precipitated by the positive finding. Some parents-to-be may feel it would have been 
better for them not to have known in advance about the disability of their child. Others, 
however, will feel differently, and use their early knowledge either to adjust their life to the 
new situation of raising a disabled child or to decide against giving birth to the child. The 
main effect of the black boxing phenomenon under consideration, thus, is to deprive the 
pregnant woman of the option to voluntarily decide against gaining the predictive knowledge 
about her child’s possible disability. This may contribute to a change from the “unconditional 
pregnancy” to the “tentative pregnancy”—at least if it is true that unconditional love is to 
some extent a by-product of blissful ignorance, as argued above. Wieser adds to this point a 
second observation: not only is the positive finding a knowledge that generates the new 
situation of having to decide for or against the child. Additionally, the predictive knowledge 
                                                 
6  As Wieser has observed empirically, “(i)t is remarkable that counselling is always provided prior to an 
amniocentesis, but not prior to ultrasound, where thorough counselling is usually carried out only if an 
amniocentesis is indicated, i.e. only after the ultrasound findings are already at hand” (in this volume, 117). There 
is little counselling in advance concerning the character of ultrasound examination as a tool to detect possible 
disabilities and the consequences of searching for this information. There can be little doubt that this practice of 
medical counselling contributes to the perception of ultrasound screening as a normal, harmless, and enjoyable 
procedure. 
about the child’s disability becomes a means to influence this decision. To make this point, he 
refers to Latour’s concept of inscription.  
Inscription  
Latour believes that “whenever we discover a stable social relation, it is the introduction of 
some non-humans that accounts for this relative stability” (Latour 1991, 111). According to 
Latour (1996b) it is one of the main differences between primate societies and human 
societies that in primate society social structures are created and maintained solely through 
direct social interaction whereas in human societies sociality is created and maintained mainly 
through objects in which certain programmes of action are inscribed and which prescribe 
certain programmes of action to humans (and other objects). “Whereas for monkeys it 
constructs social life step by step, one could say that, for humans, interaction was never more 
than a residual category” (ibid., 230). The paradigmatic example of his assumption that 
“technology is society made durable” is the street bump, a low hump across the street that 
forces car drivers to reduce their speed, since “(i)t is impossible for us not to slow down, or 
else we break our suspension” (Latour 1992, 244; cf. Latour 1994, 38).7 The example is 
chosen to demonstrate that technological artefacts perform the tasks delegated to them in a 
more relentless way than the actants who would otherwise have to perform these tasks: the 
street bump’s activity of damaging fast driving cars follows inevitably and, therefore, this 
device is more efficient in slowing down the traffic than a policeman or a traffic sign (cf. 
Latour 1992, 244). Of course it is not the street bump only in its material form that produces 
this effect: “The street bump is not made of matter, ultimately; it is full of engineers and 
chancellors and lawmakers, commingling their wills and their story lines with those of gravel, 
concrete, paint, and standard calculations” (Latour 1994, 41). There are several other actants, 
the allies, who contribute to the programme of action of slowing down the traffic—for 
example the engineers by designing the street bump so that the fast driving car does not 
damage it but is itself damaged. Even the reckless car drivers involuntarily contribute to it as 
long as they prefer their cars to remain intact over driving fast. Within this set of interrelated 
activities and expectations, however, the road bump’s presence adds its specific relentlessness 
to the overall programme of action.  
According to Latour, with the introduction of the street bump a shift from a negotiable to a 
non-negotiable situation takes place. While the reckless driver may decide to ignore the traffic 
sign, ignoring the street bump is no option because of its immediate consequences. However, 
“(t)he shift is not from discourse to matter because (…) the street bump is one meaningful 
articulation (…) Thus, we remain in meaning but no longer in discourse” (cf. Latour 1994, 
39). This change explains the relentlessness of the street bump: in contrast to the appeal 
articulated by norms, signs and symbols, the appeal articulated by the technological artefact 
can hardly be disputed.  
Wieser argues that with the introduction of ultrasound screening the pregnant women are 
confronted with a similar shift from a disputable to an undisputable appeal. His line of 
reasoning presupposes the existence of a normative appeal comparable to the traffic rules and 
signs in the example of the street bump. In his opinion, there is such an appeal which 
“expresses the quintessence of a specific (neo-liberal) reproduction policy” (Wieser in this 
                                                 
7  As Latour (1992, 244) reports, this device is called “un gendarme couché” in France. In English it is colloquially 
called “sleeping policeman”. In Germany different variants of this device are known as “Krefelder Kissen”, 
“Berliner Kissen”, or “Kölner Teller”. 
volume, 120). It says: “If you want to have children think carefully under what circumstances 
you want to have them and take on the responsibility for your decision!” (ibid.). In the case of 
a positive finding, he argues, the ultrasound image appeals to the pregnant woman in a similar 
but not discursive and therefore less disputable way: “Our woman now looks at the image. 
Doesn’t she stand in front of a ‘bump in the road’ that is as unyielding as concrete? For a 
woman in such a situation it will be equally difficult to ignore the appeal addressed to her as it 
is for a shock absorber of a car confronted with a speed bump made of concrete” (ibid., 121).  
I will leave aside the question to what degree it is justified to assume that pregnant women (or 
parents-to-be) are exposed to the pressure of neo-liberal norms which demand that they 
should not become a burden to society by giving birth to a disabled child. The question I will 
focus on is: assuming that a social pressure of this kind exists, is the ultrasound image (or 
more general: prenatal testing) a more relentless way to articulate it? In my opinion the 
answer is “no” in one respect, but to a certain degree “yes” in another. There are two different 
answers because there are two different mechanisms by which norms become less disputable 
when their enforcement is delegated to technological artefacts.  
The one source of the technological artefact’s relentlessness is its property as a 
“means/end/sanction combination” (cf. Linde 1982, 23: “Mittel/Zweck/Sanktion-
Kombination”). The enforcement of social norms is an activity which in principle is 
independent of the norm itself. It requires sanctioning mechanisms which typically are not 
specific to the norm in question but can have a different shape (e.g. social disapproval or legal 
punishment of the violator) and a different intensity (the aim can be to punish each delinquent 
as in the case of murder or can be less ambitious as in the enforcement of traffic rules). The 
observance of social norms, thus, is (of course to different degrees) disputable because social 
norms are only externally connected with their sanctioning mechanisms and because of the 
different intensity of the enforcement efforts. The punishment following the violation of 
technologically embodied rules, in contrast, is an integral part of using technology. The 
sanctioning mechanism, as it were, is part of the technological artefact’s algorithmic structure. 
Jürgen Habermas (1969, 63) puts it this way: “In both cases the violation of the rule has 
different consequences. Incompetent behavior that violates well-tried technical rules (…) is 
per se doomed to failure; the ‘punishment’ is quasi built into reality as failure. Deviant 
behavior that violates applicable norms provokes sanctions which are connected only 
externally by convention”.  
The shift from the disputable to the undisputable, however, has a second dimension. Latour 
addresses this dimension in his statement on the street bump quoted above “we remain in 
meaning but no longer in discourse”. The meaning of the street bump is more or less the same 
as the meaning of the traffic sign it substitutes (or supplements): to serve as a contributor to 
the slowing-down-the-traffic programme of action. The traffic sign and the street bump both 
are allies in the fight against the anti-programmes of reckless drivers. But the traffic sign is a 
useful ally in this fight only as long as the opponents know that this is the traffic sign’s 
meaning. In contrast, the street bump plays its part as a contributor to the slowing-down 
programme, no matter whether the reckless driver realises its meaning. Approaching a street 
bump, the reckless driver applies the brake as he or she would have to do in the case of a 
pothole, too—i.e. independent of whether the obstacle has the meaning to cause drivers like 
him or her to slow down. For practical reasons, the immediate reaction in an interaction with 
technological artefacts and procedures is usually directed at the events that are perceived to be 
its effects (and to the question of how to bring or not to bring them about) and not to the 
meaning it embodies. And as long as the attention is drawn away from the artefacts’ meaning 
this meaning is indisputable. It is invisible, and we are no longer in discourse.  
In Latour’s example of the street bump—as well as in his story about weighting the hotel 
keys—the artefacts’ property as a means/end/sanction combination clearly explains the major 
part of the relentlessness of these non-humans as proponents of the respective programmes of 
action. In the case of prenatal testing, however, a comparable “punishment”—following 
immediately from the violation of technologically objectified rules and evoking an immediate 
reaction of the pregnant woman in order to avoid it—obviously does not exist. Thus, if 
ultrasound screening leads to a shift from disputable neo-liberal norms to a less disputable 
situation of technical mediation it must be due to the effect of technology to draw away the 
attention from its meaning by focusing attention on its effects. Wieser’s metaphor “images 
like concrete” should be interpreted in this direction: the neo-liberal reproduction policy as 
characterised by him claims that the pregnant woman’s (or the couple’s) decision should be 
based on a cost-benefit calculation. Prenatal testing, then, can be seen as a tacit way to impose 
the rationality of cost-benefit calculation on her (or them). The ultrasound screening that 
provides a positive finding and the subsequent amniocentesis that allows the probability of a 
possible disability of the child to be specified clearly provide a necessary precondition for 
such a cost-benefit calculation. Moreover, the procedure of gaining this knowledge itself may 
affect the parents-to-be with the logic of calculation without them realising this. If empirically 
observable, this would be a further exemplification of the outshining phenomenon. However, 
the argument that such a tacit transformation of the pregnant women (or the parents) into 
rational calculating decision makers would express a technical mediation of a neo-liberal 
reproduction policy has two weak points. First, it includes the more or less pronounced 
assumption that there are actors who actually use prenatal testing as a means to enforce neo-
liberal norms. Otherwise it would make no sense to view prenatal testing as a less disputable 
way to implement them. The fear that such an instrumentalisation might occur surely is 
justified but Wieser does not present empirical data indicating that strategies of this kind are 
actually employed. Second, it is plausible to assume that being involved in a course of action 
leading from one examination to the next and more precise one may influence pregnant 
women such that they adopt the logic of calculation inherent in the technical procedure. 
However, it does not follow that the calculation criteria then used in the decision making are 
those the proponents of neo-liberal governmentality would like them to use.  
Conclusion  
Those who are convinced that the established concepts of the social sciences are insufficient 
to analyse and understand the interrelated roles of humans and non-humans which constitute 
the “socio-technical imbroglios” (Latour 1988a, 309) of our world have two different 
conceptual options: post-sociality or post-human sociality. The first conceptual option is the 
more radical. It means abandoning sociology and starting a new enterprise, for example a 
“science of associations” (Latour 1988b, 40). The second option is more conservative but for 
most sociologists radical enough. It means abandoning the assumption that human actors are 
the only movers of social processes and thus requires established concepts and categories to 
be broadened and supplemented in order to conceive the non-human entities’ social activities 
as well as those of the human actors. Actor network theory oscillates between post-sociality 
and post-human sociality. Most of what I have characterised to be a purification of empirical 
reality in my opinion goes back to the tendency to develop actor network theory as a post-
social theory. For example, the failure to take power relations into account in the concept of 
the hybrid actor, or the missing differentiation between exercising agency and attributing 
actorhood, are consequences of post-social thinking. At the same time, actor network theory 
provides many insights that can and should be exploited for developing a post-human 
sociality point of view (cf. Rammert & Schulz-Schaeffer 2002). This is what this chapter was 
about: to reinterpret central concepts of actor network theory as concepts of an emerging 
approach towards post-human sociality.  
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